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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Rome Canzano Esq. 





Auburn, New York 13021 
Cayuga CF 
04-083-19 B 
April 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. 
Cruse, Davis, Shapiro 
Appellant's Brief received October 4, 20}9 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings ar:id Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release· Decision Notice (Form 9026), COtvfP AS instrumen~; Offender. Case 
Plan. 
Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~-----.~ _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
~rmed _· _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo intervie\v _ Modified to -------'-
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals U~t's Findings and the separate ridings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the :rllinate's Counsel, if any, on a . . mo T. 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appel1arit - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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   Appellant challenges the April 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 24-month hold. Appellant’s instant offense involved him driving a car in an intoxicated condition 
and hitting a person riding a bicycle, thereby killing him. Appellant then fled the scene. Upon 
arrest, appellant blew a .27% BAC.  Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board decision 
is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to 
consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the Board ignored his receipt of 
an EEC, with its presumption of release. 3) the decision was predetermined. 4) the Board failed to 
comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the mostly positive COMPAS 
was ignored, and the statutes are now rehabilitation and present/future based. 
 
   Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the 
specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  
People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 
1983). Whereas here the inmate has received an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a 
finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not 
live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the 
welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 
771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1st Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 
N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992).  While 
consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th 
Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).   
 
   There is no requirement in the law that the board place equal or greater emphasis on appellant's 
present commendable conduct than on the gravity of his offense.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 133, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983). The Board 
was not required to give each factor equal weight and could place greater emphasis on the gravity 
of the inmate’s offense.  Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d 
Dept. 2018); Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 
235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53 N.Y.S.3d 404, 149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of Furman v. Annucci, 138 A.D.3d 1269, 28 N.Y.S.3d 352 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter 
of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Copeland v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 154 A.D.3d 1157, 63 N.Y.S.3d 548 (3d Dept. 2017).    
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    Although the Board placed particular emphasis on the nature of the crime, the Board considered 
other factors and was not required to give equal weight to or discuss each factor considered.  Matter 
of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Arena v. 
New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d 
Dept. 2017);  Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 
(3d Dept. 2018).   
   The Board may cite an inmate’s prior history of irresponsible driving in its decision. Confoy v New 
York State Division of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept 1991); Wade v 
Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017). 
   The Board could consider a history of alcohol abuse in its decision. Mclain v New York State 
Division of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629, 630  (2d Dept 1994). 
   The Board may consider the inmate’s prior fleeing the area after the commission of his crime. 
Larmon v Travis, 14 A.D.3d 960, 787 N.Y.S.2d 918 (3d Dept 2005).   
   The Board may consider the potential danger an inmate would pose to the community if the inmate 
were to be released Bridget v Travis, 300 A.D.2d 776, 750 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dept 2002) or that the 
inmate would place the public at risk. Valerio v Dennison, 35 A.D.3d 938, 825 N.Y.S.2d 574 (3d 
Dept. 2006); Arena v New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 156 
A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); Constant v Stanford, 157 A.D.3d 1175, 67 N.Y.S.3d 
508 (3d Dept. 2018). 
    The Board may consider the probable repercussions of the criminal’s actions upon the victims’ 
families. Bottom v New York State Board of Parole, 30 A.D.3d 657, 815 N.Y.S.2d 789  (3d Dept. 
2006). 
   The Board may take into account an inmate’s  when denying parole release.  See 
Matter of Dudley v. Travis, 227 A.D.2d 863, 642 N.Y.S.2d 386 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 88 N.Y.2d 
812, 649 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1996); Matter of Baker v. Russi, 188 A.D.2d 771, 591 N.Y.S.2d 540 (3d 
Dept. 1992); see also Pender v. Travis, 243 A.D.2d 889, 662 N.Y.S.2d 642 (3d Dept. 1997), lv. 
denied, 91 N.Y.2d 810, 670 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1998); People ex rel. Brown v. New York State Dept. 
of Correctional Services, Parole Bd. Div., 67 A.D.2d 1108, 415 N.Y.S.2d 137 (4th Dept. 1979), 
appeal denied, 47 N.Y.2d 707, 418 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1979); Rodriguez v. Henderson, 56 A.D.2d 
729, 730, 392 N.Y.S.2d 757, 758 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 801, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1025 
(1977). 
    Receipt of an EEC does not preclude denial of parole.  Matter of Milling v. Berbary, 31 A.D.3d 
1202, 1203, 819 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 822 N.Y.S.2d 481 
(2006); Matter of Romer v. Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 867, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (3d Dept. 
2005); Matter of Barad v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 
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(3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001). An EEC does not 
automatically entitle an inmate to discretionary release or eliminate consideration of the statutory 
factors including the instant offense.  Matter of Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 33 
A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Pearl v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of White v. 
Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006).  Moreover, the Board is not 
required to give each factor equal weight.  Matter of Corley, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 
817, 818; Matter of Pearl, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817.  The Board may deny release 
to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the 
inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not 
compatible with the welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. 
Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (2d Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 
176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 
N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). The Board acted within its discretion in determining other considerations 
rebutted any presumption created by the EEC and rendered discretionary release inappropriate at this 
time.   See generally Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Furman v. Annucci, 138 A.D.3d 1269, 28 N.Y.S.3d 352 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Neal v. 
Stanford, 131 A.D.3d 1320, 16 N.Y.S.3d 342 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Singh v. Evans, 107 
A.D.3d 1274, 1275, 968 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649-50 (3d Dept. 2013).   
   There is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense.  
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 
2000). There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative 
fact-finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d 
Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 
N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and 
internal policies in fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 
1371 (2000). Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption that the Board complied with its 
duty.  See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 
(2d Dept. 1985). 
      Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and 
without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
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standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d 
Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason 
or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  Siao-Paul 
v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State Board of Parole, 
169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019). 
   The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
      In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.       
   Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law 
is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 
2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 
A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). 
   Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do 
not represent a forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for 
release decisions.  This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, 
considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive 
change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process.  In 
2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs 
principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  
The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane 
v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of 
Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 
985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never 
intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information 
from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 
amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of 
each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  Executive Law 
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§ 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The amendments 
also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when 
deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS 
instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  
Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the 
statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied.  
See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017). 
 
   The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other statutory 
factors.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); 
accord Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). The 
Board still is entitled to place greater emphasis on the instant offense.  See Matter of Montane v. 
Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo 
v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 
A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
